A Framework for Error Correction Under Prediction by Russ McBride
all animals across the entire phylogenetic 
scale, actively control ourselves and select 
portions of the world around us to advance 
our success in the environment. And since 
the origins of life we have relied on exactly 
one principal to do this.
Three to four billion years ago the first 
single-celled microorganisms enclosed 
themselves in a phospholipid membrane 
which provided a clearly demarcated 
boundary between that portion of the envi-
ronment that could be readily controlled 
and the rest of the world. The advantages of 
controlling one’s immediate environment 
are enormous. It frees the creature from the 
oscillations of the external world and allows 
it to hold fixed, in the face of environmen-
tal variability, conditions it can rely on to 
more easily thrive in the world. This is the 
core principal of physiology (Michael et al., 
2009)1; even evolution depends on it. The 
principle at work has a name. It is called 
homeostasis. Homeostasis is the active regu-
lation (the control) of some parameter such 
that if that parameter falls outside its target 
range the regulatory system will resist that 
change and recover back to target. Such 
systems can be fleetingly brief of life-long. 
Inherent in a living organism, homeostasis 
has been so successful that it is multiplied 
thousands of thousands of times deep into 
every system of the body of an advanced 
mammal like us.
In general, the greater the number of 
homeostatic regulatory systems the more 
evolutionarily advanced the creature and 
the greater its ability to succeed in diverse 
conditions. Cold-blooded creatures (ecto-
therms) like snakes, do not have a homeo-
static system for regulating temperature so 
they are slowed to the point of immobility in 
cold weather, while an endotherm like you 
and I can function pretty much the same as 
Clark describes a budding trend in neuro-
science toward what he calls a “predictive 
processing” model, the core idea of which 
is pretty simple. The brain is a prediction 
machine. It generates top-down predictions 
about expected sensory input. These col-
lide with actual bottom-up sensory input, 
canceling out the matches, and leaving 
only the prediction errors to propagate 
forward. This model nicely explains a vari-
ety of otherwise anomalous experimental 
results and dovetails cleanly with Bayesian 
modeling formalisms. As such it is a won-
derfully concise model that gets at a critical 
and under-appreciated component of brain 
activity – error correction under prediction.
Clark has got a hold of the steering wheel 
here but does not notice he is in a car… and 
steering wheels abound. He sees error cor-
rection under prediction everywhere he 
looks (a generalization I applaud), first see-
ing it in action in addition to sensation, then 
so ubiquitous as to be the unifying archi-
tecture of “mind, brain, and action” that 
can illuminate perception, action, learning, 
attention (p. 60), and potentially robust con-
scious experience (p. 48). The now more-
broadly named “action-oriented predictive 
processing model” offers “the best clue yet 
to the shape of a unified science of mind 
and action” (p. 1) and promises “to bring 
cognition, perception, action, and attention 
together within a common framework” (p. 
30). This is bold. This approach is not a 
small component of a broader theory; error 
correction under prediction is the general 
unifying theory, one that is on the verge of 
unveiling nothing less than an expansive, 
unifying account of mind, and behavior.
As such it is false, and it is false for an 
important reason – we are not essentially 
prediction machines – and so, as a general 
unifying account of mind and action it is 
radically misguided. But it is also correct for 
important reasons. Error correction under 
prediction is everywhere. The question is, 
why? This question is, perhaps, the single 
most important question to ask about mind 
and behavior, and it has a simple answer, 
one which I shall try to make clear. Clark 
has the most important piece, but only a 
sub-component of the answer.
The refutation first. As it turns out I am 
sitting in my office and I am thirsty. But 
there is no water here. Per Clark, I am essen-
tially a prediction machine. I am driven by 
my brain whose ultimate purpose is to can-
cel out discrepancies between what I pre-
dict my sensory input to deliver and what it 
actually delivers. So I look around from my 
chair and form various low-level (mostly 
unconscious) predictions about what I will 
see as I turn my head. I am mostly correct (I 
have spent many hours here, after all) but I 
am off in numerous small ways for which 
I adjust. And I sit. I predict the continued 
sensation of the chair against my back. And I 
sit. And I automatically engage more predic-
tions. And I sit. And I sit. And, eventually, 
as it turns out, I die of thirst.
Why did I just die? Because I became 
essentially a prediction machine instead of 
essentially a living survival machine. A pre-
diction machine passively predicts; a survival 
machine takes action to survive. Is prediction 
so fundamental to us that it can explain mind 
and action? I submit, no. It offers no expla-
nation of why, in reality, when I am thirsty 
I get up from my chair and walk down the 
hall to get a glass of water. In fact, on its own, 
it can never explain any action (though it 
is a critical component of every action). 
This approach in the worst case leads one to 
sterilize psychology clean of drives, desires, 
and motivations to action, a la the “desert 
landscape” version of Friston et al. (2011), or 
forces one to somehow tac them on ad hoc.
What are living organisms, essentially? 
This might seems like philosophical grist 
for generations to come, but biology has 
a rather simple answer. Living creature do 
things; inanimate objects do not. We, and 
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1They describe nine core principles of physiology and 
the other eight, arguably, all depend on homeostasis.
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Many background commitments of 
Clark I am equally supportive of: the pos-
sibility of a common underlying neural 
“computation,” and hence, blurring and 
interplay, between action and sensation3, 
the importance of feedback loops at lower 
and higher levels, probabilistic generative 
modeling, and, the idea supported by Clark 
that the mind strives to “lower information-
theoretic free energy” … or put in my terms: 
the mind is a self-sustaining system striving 
for equilibrium against a assaults of inter-
nal and external forces. Action is often the 
shortest course to equilibrium, so thirst, 
among many other drives, bumps one out 
of equilibrium, and serves as a motivating 
force to acquire water.
So, the homeostatic approach is not a 
rejection of the overwhelming majority of 
the content of Clark’s excellent work, but 
rather a framework for it. This both stream-
lines the middle and higher level work and 
provides a more compelling structure 
within which to elucidate the lower-level 
advances in neuroscience he describes.
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we do when we are in warmer climes. That 
is the advantage of a temperature regulat-
ing system that keeps our body temperature 
within a tight range of variability.
Physiology is the study of the functions 
of living organisms and every physiologi-
cal function is commonly understood as 
a homeostatic system – the density of our 
bones, the beating of our heart, the blinking 
of our eyes, the release of adrenaline, the 
acidity of our stomachs, the firing of our 
neurons, the rate of cell turnover, the popu-
lation of digestive bacteria in our guts, the 
secretion of the amylase enzyme, the levels 
of our hormones, the concentration of CO
2
 
in our blood, an so on. The curious reader 
can grab any standard physiology text and 
bone up on a nearly endless list of them.
Every physiological system is now under-
stood as a system that “strives” to maintain 
control over select biochemical parameters 
to keep them within a “desired” range… 
with one rather notable exception in the 
literature. That exception is the mind. But 
why should the mind be given the right of 
exceptional exclusion from the otherwise 
exception-less rule of physiology? Clearly 
the brain, the extended nervous system, and 
its enormous variety of interrelated homeo-
static systems cannot be excluded from the 
natural order. So, unless one takes up the 
unenviable position of arguing for a division 
between the brain and mind so sharp as to 
leave the former in the domain of natural law 
and the latter outside it, then the mind, too, 
is a homeostatic system, or more accurately, 
a collection of homeostatic regulatory con-
trol systems (albeit, many quite dynamic or 
short-lived). Let’s call this the Homeostasis 
Thesis: The mind, like all physiological sys-
tems is a homeostatic system (for a more 
detailed analysis see McBride, 2008/2011).
If the entire central nervous system is a 
massive collection of homeostatic systems 
then the cognitive and behavioral activities 
that supervene over the central nervous sys-
tem are also homeostatic. And this is easy 
to see in any of the vast arrays of behavioral 
patterns we deploy. The behavior of living 
organisms is directed under its own con-
trol. It exerts control through its behavior 
in order to satisfy its needs, desires, and val-
ues2. This control system is best understood 
the way any physiological control system 
is – as a homeostatic system. There is an 
unfolding of sensorimotor experiences that 
I expect as I, e.g., tie my shoe. That tempo-
rally extended pattern forms the extended 
target within which I keep my sensorimotor 
experiences as I tie my shoe. As I deviate 
from them, say, by failing to push one lace 
completely under the other, I adjust and 
push further to get the shoelace under.
Every homeostatic system has the follow-
ing features: A regulated parameter; a target 
goal state; a correction system; a context of 
regularities the system depends upon; and an 
evaluation system. The critical piece of any 
homeostatic system is the error correction 
system which corrects back toward a target 
goal state. It is an active process. Of course, 
on a more passive approach, we could call the 
goal state the “prediction” (and the correction 
system “error correction”). This brings us to 
the punchline you can now guess: Clark’s 
error correction under prediction is only a 
part (arguably the most important part) of 
a larger structure at play – the homeostatic 
system. And error correction under predic-
tion is everywhere we look because each error 
correction system is part of a homeostatic 
system and homeostasis is everywhere.
There are advantages to understanding 
cognition as thoroughly homeostatic instead 
of thoroughly sprinkled with only the error 
correction component of the homeostatic 
model. First, it provides a more complete 
account. Second, it seamlessly merges with 
the entire corpus of physiology and biology. 
Third, it inclines us toward a more accurate 
account of the purpose of cognition: to 
increase our active successful engagement 
of our environment (not passive prediction 
of it). Fourth, it disinclines us away from 
the problematic “desert landscape vision” 
of Friston et al. (2011) where goals, motiva-
tions, values, drives, and reward signals are 
eliminated from our psychological existence 
en-masse, napalm-style. Fifth, it is inherently 
an account of activity so, unlike the predic-
tion model, it does not struggle to explain 
action. Sixth, it is inherently a control sys-
tem framework so it merges perfectly with 
more detailed control system interpretations. 
Finally, all the wonderful low-level neural 
processing that Clark describes (like evidence 
that targets/predictions flow downward and 
error signals flow upward) is accommodated, 
and perhaps even more naturally explained, 
under the homeostatic model.
2A more complete account of how motivations and 
drives come to attach to certain behavior patterns is 
discussed in more detail in McBride (2008/2011).
3The prediction model has a harder time explaining ac-
tion; the homeostatic model has a harder time explai-
ning sensation. The mechanics, as Clark and I agree, 
are similar. With sensation, top-down neural activity 
is adjusted based on the resultant error (and the pre-
diction, aka the temporary homeostatic target, is mo-
dified). With action, there is a larger action goal/target 
that remains in place while top-down neural activity 
that connects to motor output is adjusted based on the 
resultant deviation from expected sensorimotor activity.
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